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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooooo 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
DANNY C. HARDMAN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
ooooo 
No. 940272CA 
Civil No. 935015120 
Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPFT.T.ANT 
REPLY TO POINT I 
Defendant agrees that the trial court is given discretion in 
controlling the duration and scope of closing argument. Herring v. 
New York, 95 S.Ct 2550, 2555 (1975). See, also. State v. St. 
Clair, 282 P.2d 323, 331 (Utah 1955). However, the trial court 
must exercise discretion within the limitations imposed by State 
and Federal Constitutions. Herring v. New York, 95 S.Ct 2550 at 
2555. 
Given these constitutional limitations, the question before 
this court is whether the trial court has, by limiting closing 
argument to ten minutes, abused this discretion. Keeping in mind 
that no portion of a criminal trial is "more important than the 
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opportunity to marshall the evidence before submission of the case 
to judgment." Herring v. New York. 95 S.Ct at 2555. 
The answer to the question before this court is clear. The 
limitations imposed on defendant's counsel by the trial court which 
limited closing argument to 10 minutes is a denial of Defendant's 
right to "marshall the evidence." Id. This denial by the trial 
court is a violation of Defendant's right to "appear and defend in 
person and by counsel" guaranteed by Article I §12 of the Utah 
Constitution and the Sixth Amendment guaranteed by the U.S. 
Constitution. 
The Appellee has characterization the case of Foster v. State. 
464 So.2d 1214 (Fla. App. 3 Dist. 1984), as standing for the 
proposition that restricting defendant's counsel to a closing 
argument of less than 30 minutes would not be an abuse of the trial 
court's discretion. This is a mischaracterization of the court's 
holding in Foster. The Foster case stands for the proposition that 
there is no requirement that Defendant's counsel's closing argument 
be at least thirty minutes long in order to avoid a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 1217. However, the 
Foster court took no position on whether a closing argument, with 
a limit of less than thirty minutes, would be an abuse of 
discretion. Id. at 1217. Rather, the Foster court looked to the 
judgment of defense counsel in determining the length of the 
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closing argument that would be in Defendants best interest. Id. 
at 1217. Therefore, this court gains no incite, into whether there 
was an abuse of discretion in this case, from the Foster decision. 
The Appellee has also cited the case of U.S. v. Moye, 951 F.2d 
59 (5th Cir. 1992). In an attempt to dissuade this court from 
finding the trial court's ten minute closing argument limit was an 
abuse of discretion. The Moye case is factually very different from 
the case before this court for several reasons. First, the Moye 
case involved a "single-issue" trial dealing with the parties' 
knowledge or intent. Id. at 63. The case before this court is a 
multifaceted DUI case, with neither alcohol or illegal drugs were 
involved. In this case, the defense counsel was required to 
address the following issues: (1) the reliability of field 
sobriety tests, (2) the effect of Defendant's prescription drug on 
the central nervous system, (3) whether the levels of meprobamate 
and carisoprodol were within therapeutic levels, (4) whether the 
meprobamate indicated a recently ingested high dosage or simply 
long term usage at the normal rate, (5) whether the levels were 
higher or lower than when Mr. Hardman was driving, and (6) whether 
any conclusions as to his level of impairment could scientifically 
and accurately could be drawn from the blood test. 
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Second, there were numerous contradictions in the evidence 
presented* These two factors alone distinguished the single-issue 
Moye decision from the trial court's decision in the instant case. 
Therefore, use of the Foster and Moye decisions by Appellee 
are of little relevance in determining whether or not this trial 
court abused its discretion, and thus violated defendant's 
constitutionally protected rights to a fair trial and an effective 
assistance of counsel• 
REPLY TO POINT II 
The Appellee's argument that the trial court's castigation of 
defense counsel did not prohibit Defendant from obtaining a fair 
trial also falls short of convincing. The Appellee has cited the 
case of Strickland v. Washington. 104 S.Ct 2052 (1984), and State 
v. Kniaht, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987) in support of its proposition 
that a judicial comment must undermine the confidence in the jury's 
verdict in order for reversible error to have occurred. However, 
neither of these cases deal with the castigation of defense counsel 
or limitation of time for closing argument. The Strickland case 
deals with attorney error in not requesting a psychiatric 
examination, and the nondisclosure of evidence of Defendant's past 
criminal background via a presentence report. Strickland at 2054-
55. Similarly, the Knight case deals with the nondisclosure of 
evidence of potential witnesses by the prosecution. Knight at 916. 
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Neither of these cases deal directly with the guestion of a trial 
court's castigation of Defendant's counsel, as it relates to the 
deprivation of Defendant's rights of a fair trial or assistance of 
counsel; and, therefore appear to have little precedential value. 
Finally, the case of People v. Young, 618 N.E.2nd 1026 (111. 
App. 1 Dist. 1993), cited by Appellee, also fails to support 
Appellee's position that the trial court Judge's comments were 
harmless. While the Young court held that the judicial comments 
were not a material factor in the Young case, the Young court made 
it clear that it would have been prejudicial, and thus result in 
reversible error, if the trial judge had conveyed improper 
prejudicial impressions to the jury by displaying a hostile 
attitude toward defense counsel by inferring that defense counsel's 
presentation, such as a closing argument, is unimportant. Id. at 
1034. This is precisely the situation which occurred at the trial 
court level in the instant case, and this court should similarly 
find the trial court's remarks were prejudicial, and thus denied 
Defendant the right to a fair trial and effective assistance of 
counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, Defendant Danny C. Hardman, 
requests this Court reverse the remand for a new trial. 
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Respectfully submitted this J2 day of March, 1995. 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C. 
X t 2. . 
/ \_ - ^ ^ <-\ *-— 
TERRY k. SPENCER 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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